The Suez Canal After the Crisis: What Carriers are Preparing for in 2026

The Suez Canal, which for decades served as a vital part of the trade route between Asia and Europe, has ceased to be a stable solution. Despite a formal decrease in military activity in the Red Sea, the shipping market has not returned to its pre-crisis operational logic.

In turn, the market is currently experiencing planning uncertainty as carriers enter 2026. USM reports on the challenges facing the industry in 2026 and the advice offered by Ukrainian logistics experts.

Challenges Faced by Carriers Last Year

Last year, the route through the Suez Canal remained problematic for a significant portion of the market. As of May, vessel tonnage in Suez was approximately 70% lower than in 2023. This sustained the practice of bypassing via the Cape of Good Hope for many liner services and part of the tanker segment.

The additional miles quickly translated into a capacity shortage. Vessels are tied up in voyages longer, container turnover is slowing down, and free tonnage in the system vanished without any fleet scrapping. In early July, the market received a reminder that Red Sea risk is measured in more than just miles—insurance costs also spiked. War risk premiums rose from approximately 0.3% to 0.7% of the vessel’s value, with some quotes reaching 1%. For a vessel with an estimated value of $100 million, a 0.7% premium means about $700,000 for a single transit, excluding other surcharges.

This state of affairs lasted until October, when Yemeni militants announced a “truce.” However, the first practical signals of a cautious return of shipping to the region only appeared in December. On December 4, the CEO of Hapag-Lloyd stated that the return would be gradual. He estimated a transition period of 60–90 days to restructure logistics and avoid port congestion caused by a simultaneous pivot of numerous services back to Suez.

By December 18–19, 2025, the container ship Maersk Sebarok passed through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The company called this an initial transit and did not announce a full return to Suez for its East-West network. Another shipping giant, CMA CGM, announced plans to return to the Suez Canal starting in January (i.e., this year).

Despite the decline in Houthi activity, another marker of instability in Yemen appeared on December 30. The Saudi coalition launched strikes on the port of Mukalla. The Yemen factor remained unpredictable at the end of 2025; thus, the return to Suez appeared managed and phased.

Carrier Sentiments in 2026

Global carriers entered the new year with the same risks and challenges. Although the Red Sea route has not been attacked since September 29, the Suez Canal remained underutilized by 60% even after 100 days without attacks.

BIMCO reported that in the first week of 2026, transits were approximately 60% lower than in the same week of 2023. Since January 2024, when mass diversions around the Cape of Good Hope began, quarterly transit volumes through the canal have remained 51–64% below 2023 levels. Throughout 2025, transits were 57–64% lower than pre-crisis levels, with the largest drop in the container segment (–86% in Q4 compared to 2023). For other segments in Q4 2025, the data is as follows: bulk carriers –55%, crude oil tankers –32%.

The exception is product tankers. Increased freight premiums accelerated their return, so in Q4 2025, their transit was only 19% lower than in 2023 (compared to –45% in 2024).

World carriers have not shown a unified reaction. Maersk announced the resumption of one of its services via the Suez Canal in January. Specifically, a weekly route connecting the Middle East and India with the U.S. East Coast, known as MECL, starts today. It will be the first in the company’s phased return to the Suez route. Maersk also stated that one of its vessels tested the route as the ceasefire in Gaza provided hope for normal shipping, and one vessel also made a voyage through the Suez Canal in December.

In contrast, CMA CGM is scaling back Suez Canal services again—the company is temporarily withdrawing its FAL 1, FAL 3, and MEX services from the Suez route and redirecting them around the Cape of Good Hope. CMA CGM attributed the decision to a “complex and uncertain international context” but provided no further details.

Thus, despite market analysts’ expectations, the “truce” declared by the Houthis in the fall did not automatically return the market to a pre-war state. It appears the route problem will persist in the industry at least through this year, and full recovery may take several years. Returning services to Suez means synchronizing the fleet, crews, port windows, and inland logistics, which will take significant time even in the absence of unpredictable political factors.

This explains why the market saw divergent decisions from lines at the end of the year. For some companies, returning to Suez was an opportunity to release vessels from long voyages faster and increase turnover; for others, the risk remained too high amid a still-unstable security situation. Consequently, instead of a single scenario, a system has formed where different services operate under different logic, even within the same direction.

In these conditions, the main challenge has shifted from choosing the “right” route to managing uncertainty. The entire logistics chain has begun flexible planning, leaving a window for rapid reaction; therefore, issues of diversification, hub selection, and readiness to switch between scenarios have come to the forefront.

How Ukrainian Carriers Should Account for These Issues

Ukrainian logisticians are, of course, monitoring the situation. As Volodymyr Guz, Commercial Director of Global Ocean Link (GOL), told USM, the key focus is now on flexibility and rapid planning.

“We are currently living in a reality where the conditions and terms of the same route can change literally within a week. Therefore, for clients, the key is not to guess which line is right, but to build a chain that can withstand market pivots,” says Volodymyr Guz.

In the near term, GOL management sees that the market continues to respond with falling rates on the Far East – Europe direction. According to the expert, this is about volatility: schedules and conditions will be reviewed constantly rather than once a season. In the short window, the winner will be the one who can first establish a stable service via Suez—before the market accounts for further tariff reductions.

GOL also believes that Ukrainian companies need to diversify their delivery routes.

“For example, regarding sea freight and subsequent delivery to Ukraine, imports through Poland look significantly stable and predictable. The Polish hub provides more options in terms of lines, infrastructure, and inland delivery—this is critical when the maritime portion of the route is ‘floating’,” notes Volodymyr Guz.

At the same time, GOL’s Commercial Director believes there are several steps cargo owners should consider in 2026:

“First—diversify flows: distribute volumes among the top 3 lines so as not to depend on a single carrier or service. Second—place maximum emphasis on the Polish hub as a primary entry/exit point, where it is easier to switch between options and maintain chain control. Third—secure a sufficient pool of inland carriers from Poland in advance and reserve capacity for peak periods,” noted Volodymyr Guz.

According to him, significant congestion is expected at the junction of the 1st and 2nd quarters, and the availability of confirmed inland resources will be the key to meeting deadlines.

“The earlier cargo owners incorporate this into their planning, the fewer surprises there will be regarding deadlines, and the higher the chance to lock in favorable conditions before the next round of market fluctuations,” the expert concludes.

The events surrounding the Suez Canal in recent years demonstrate that global maritime logistics has entered a phase where planning is constantly challenged. Even with a formal decrease in military activity in the Red Sea, the market does not automatically return to familiar models. Line decisions remain fragmented, and the security factor remains variable, which continues to translate into volatility in rates, schedules, and routes.

Against the backdrop of “floating” security in the Red Sea, logistics increasingly operates not as a fixed route; therefore, the ability to quickly transition between these scenarios will determine who in 2026 can maintain timelines, cost control, and competitive conditions.